Introduction
Carla Lehmann, a Chilean pollster, noted at the end of 2005 that in Chile "people do not vote for religious or moral reasons. This has been empirically demonstrated." 1 If her observation were correct, this would represent a major change in Chilean politics, because religion has played an important role in shaping the nation's party system since the mid-nineteenth century. Conflicts developed at that point between those who wished to base policies and laws on Catholic social doctrine as well as to preserve a primary role for the Church in shaping educational and other public institutions, and those who preferred to forge a more secular world. The first group formed the Conservative Party,
gaining an important following all over the country from people in all walks of life. The second group gravitated to the pre-existing Liberal Party, while the most determined advocates of secularization created the Radical Party.
Subsequently, at the turn of the twentieth century, divisions over socioeconomic policies and the rise of the labor movement as well as other class based organizations added a second layer of sociopolitical conflicts that impacted the party system. These generated new political organizations on the left, the most important of which eventually became the Communist and Socialist parties. However, such conflicts did more than simply introduce new parties because, on the one hand, those formed primarily out of the religious/secular cleavage had to position themselves along the new left-to-right ideological and programmatic axis, and, on the other, the new parties had to place themselves on the religious versus secular polarity. The Liberals drifted to the right strengthening their ties to business interests, while the Radicals assumed deliberately centrist positions, solidifying their support among public and private employees. The
Conservatives split into a Social Christian group that reflected new Catholic social teachings, and a "Traditionalist" one with rightist views. In turn, Communists and Socialists adopted anticlerical views that easily blended with those held by the Radicals, a factor which subsequently facilitated the formation of coalitions among these parties. after the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet, the party system was recast into two coalitions, and to understand this dualism, writes Eugenio Tironi, "one should not look to the old social cleavages." Its origins, he adds, "lie in a new political-cultural cleavage, namely the authoritarian/democratic one, that was forged in the period 1973-90 and was crystallized by the YES/NO option in the referendum organized by Pinochet in 1988" (Tironi 2002, 38) . 3 Pinochet's defeat opened the way to a restoration of democracy under the leadership of the Concertation of Parties for Democracy coalition of center and leftist parties formed to oppose a continuation of his rule. It has constituted all governments since then, while the center-right and right forces that sided with Pinochet, first grouped in a coalition called Democracy and Progress and presently Alliance for Chile, have become the opposition. Chile's unusual "binomial" electoral formula helps reinforce the predominance of these two coalitions in the party system. 4 However, Tironi does not go so far as to assert that this new "cleavage" has completely trumped the earlier ones. With Felipe Agüero, he argues that the yes/no split has subsumed the class divide. Further, they note that the "authoritarian" side of the current division also echoes positions formerly espoused by pro-clerical leaders, while the "democratic" one identifies with secularizing forces. As a result, the parties of the Concertation have implemented "lay" measures such as legalizing divorce or eliminating censorship, whereas the parties of the Alliance have championed "conservative" moral positions and assumed narrowly "confessional" views (Tironi and Agüero 1999, 157-62) .
Alejandro Moreno also insists that issues such as "religion and abortion are especially important" in helping to define the authoritarian-democratic divide (1999, 112) .
Like Lehman, other authors are not convinced that the new "authoritariandemocratic cleavage" leaves any room at all for religiously based political differences.
This argument is presented most forcefully by Mariano Torcal and Scott Mainwaring, who note that "among voters this historic conflict has apparently disappeared in Chile today." They argue that "between 1973 and 1995 ... the religious cleavage in Chile faded"; that "religion became irrelevant as a predictor of party preference..."; and that survey data show that "religion was nowhere close to achieving statistical significance"
as an independent variable in determining electoral outcomes (Torcal and Mainwaring 2003, 65, 68, 82-83) .
In this paper we focus primarily on the effects of religion on Chileans' ideological self-positioning and electoral choices, showing that it continues to have an effect on political alignments despite the current organization of the party system. We base our observations on a survey we prepared and applied to a national sample of 1,200 subjects in large urban areas in Chile. 5 While we agree with the tempered Tironi and Agüero (1999) view that the division between the two coalitions subsumes some of the secular/religious divide, we also show that religiosity-or its absence-shapes the political choices of Concertation supporters. In addition, we explore the political effects of Catholic and Protestant religious identities. 6 And we argue that among Catholics a progressive versus conservative view of their own religiosity-and not only support or rejection of the military regime-helps guide their choice of one or the other coalition.
The yes/no division certainly galvanized the formation of the two coalitions that characterize Chile's current party system, and voting for one coalition or the other is associated with voter attitudes-and voters' families' attitudes-towards the Allende government, the military coup, and the dictatorship (López and Morales 2005) . However, this division should not be considered a party-generative social cleavage comparable to those that defined the party system in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Social Cleavages and Political Divisions
In the broadest sense, a politically relevant social cleavage in a democracy refers to the disproportionate support a sociologically defined category of the population gives to certain electoral options. 7 But not all such cleavages are party-generative ones in the Lipset and Rokkan (1967) sense. In some instances members of the category may not even be aware of their distinctive option. In other cases, members of the category may be aware of their majority option, and may well have a variety of associations and organizations that speak for their views and interests, contributing to a sense of collective identity. And yet, even in these cases no enduring party or political option may emerge from the category. The issues at hand that provoke disproportionate support may be passing ones, or pre-existing parties, despite having been created around different conflicts and with other social bases of support, may be well poised to become channels for the expression of the new views and the groups that express them. Party-generative social cleavages are, then, those which emerge on the basis of segments of the population that have specific collective identities, interests, associations, institutions, symbols, and/or distinctive subcultures, and which tend to assume common positions, antagonistic to those of other segments, over issues that are understood to be of fundamental importance. But party-generative cleavages do not simply forge parties; above all, they result in political tendencies that become ingrained in the fabric of a nation's political landscape. Political leaders and militants then create parties that express such tendencies as long as the electoral and other organizational and democratic-institutional facilitating conditions are in place. But if they eventually stray from the core symbols and attachments of the segment of the population that holds them dear, other parties may well emerge in their place, producing realignments of the links between social segments and parties. The specific content of the issues that reflect the sociopolitical divisions may also change over time, and it is conceivable, but rare, that the party-generating sociopolitical divisions may wane and even disappear as social change alters the characteristics of the segments of the population that sustained those divisions. This may presage important changes in the party system, although organizational and institutional advantages and inertia may sustain the parties for a considerable period of time.
When a national polity has two or more sociopolitical cleavages that generate political tendencies, the formation of parties becomes very complex. Parties must adopt positions on issues that reflect each of the main axes of division, and ideological and political "spaces" that combine political tendencies can facilitate the formation of specific parties that occupy them. When institutional and other factors militate strongly against the formation of multiparty systems that can express such complexity, the parties that do emerge will tend to be less ideological and more catchall, while their connections to civil society will normally be more tenuous and shifting over time as they form coalitions in their search for majorities. Multiparty systems-assuming they are well formed and have a long historicity, as the Chilean one does-develop parties that are closer to the various combinations of political tendencies that cleave a nation's political landscape and to the specific segments of society that are associated with them. Given this characteristic,
Chileans have a relatively clear sense of where the country's parties stand on the left-toright ideological scale as well as in terms of their proximity to or distance from the Catholic Church, reflecting the two longstanding religious and class cleavages that shaped the party system's political tendencies.
As Manza and Brooks note (1999, 32-33) , scholars who study the social basis of party formation have indicated that parties and party coalitions can be formed and reshaped for reasons that have little or nothing to do with the party-generative kind of social cleavages. Leadership disputes, unforeseen new issues, political scandals, external threats, deliberate crafting by powerful actors in part though electoral laws, and institutional breakdowns can have a powerful impact. Such factors can be labeled as "incidental" (J. S. Valenzuela 1997, 51-52) to distinguish them from those that create the political tendencies, and they can affect party politics for lengthy periods of time. And yet, the deeper divisions stemming from enduring social cleavages do not simply disappear as the party system is reshaped by such conflicts. Political leaders that gain the limelight through such incidental means must assume positions that define their views within the grid of ideological and issue polarities related to the main political tendencies.
The latter continue to affect political choices and differences, and they are bound to reemerge in full force given that they are reproduced by ongoing social divisions, once the incidental factors recede. Chilean politics has in the past been shaped for a generation by the legacy of powerful and controversial leaders, although the divisions they created eventually dissipated without a trace. This is what occurred, for example, with José Manuel Balmaceda, whose presidency from 1886 to 1891 culminated in a brief civil war and divided the Liberal Party until the 1920s. Pinochet is therefore not the first figure to have precipitated this kind of outcome. Consequently, as the yes/no divide wanes, the more enduring social cleavages that had an impact on the formation of Chilean politicalcultural identities and partisan alignments should come once again more to the foreground. Old and new issues that reflect these cleavages, from labor rights to the legalization of divorce, can trigger the polarization of opinion following long established patterns.
A telltale sign that the yes/no split is an "incidental" type of conflict lies in the fact that it is not associated with any specific set of associations in civil society, creating political symbols, subcultures, and collective identities. There are no organizations advocating authoritarian as opposed to democratic rule in the country. Pinochet was supported, among others, by employer associations, but these were created long before he took power and are obviously related to the class divisions in Chilean society.
Conservative Catholic circles also tended to side with the "yes," but again, they reflect longstanding divisions between Catholics. It is precisely such attachments of pre-existing segments of Chilean society in favor of Pinochet-and against him by their polar opposites-that leads to the impression that the "old cleavages" may have been "subsumed" by the "authoritarian/democratic" division (Tironi and Agüero 1999) .
Moreover, the two coalitions are formed by parties that retain their own organizations and identities. There is no prospect that two unified parties will emerge from them. The
Concertation is even divided into sub-pacts that reproduce the Catholic/secular division, with the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) on one side and the Socialists (PS), the Party for Democracy (PPD), and the Radical Social Democratic Party (PRSD) on the other.
The Union of Independent Democrats (UDI) and National Renewal (RN), the parties that form the Alliance, engage frequently in heated debates. 8 For all these reasons it is hard to view the yes/no split as a party-generative cleavage.
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Although a party system rooted in a lengthy history of electoral competition, as in Valenzuela 1995, 175-76) . In what follows we explore the ways in which religious divisions in Chilean society continue to be present in the political choices of the population.
Challenges in Examining the Political Effects of Religiosity in Chile
Research on religiosity and politics in Chile is complicated by three issues whose effects are partly interrelated. The first has to do with whether or not religiosity can be measured adequately by focusing on church attendance. The second pertains to differences between the political alignments of the nation's Catholics and Protestants.
And the third relates to the fact that the Catholic political subculture has long been politically divided. Ignoring the problems raised by these issues can easily lead to the hasty conclusion that religiosity has no effect on political choices. A brief comment on each follows.
Capturing Survey Respondents' Religiosity
Survey research on religion and politics has often used church attendance or "practice" as the key indicator for respondents' religiosity, and this has normally been the indicator of choice for such research in Chile (see for example Torcal and Mainwaring 2003, 65; Moreno 1999, 124) . But this measure does not capture adequately the extent of religiosity among Chilean Catholics, who tend to be quite religious-but also unobservant. After examining data from 31 countries collected by the International Social Survey Program, Lehmann (2002) shows that Chileans, two thirds of whom report praying daily, rank among the most religious people in the world. Only the Philippines, the United States, and Cyprus scored higher. However, in terms of church attendance
Chile ranked second to last of all countries that were surveyed, giving it the widest gap between "religiosity" and "church attendance" (Lehman 2002).
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We explored this gap in our research by asking participants in two focus groupsone Protestant and one Catholic-about church attendance. Protestants thought it was indispensable, while most Catholics felt it was not. Therefore we asked Catholics in our survey if someone could "be a good Catholic" while attending Mass only "from time to time" and 75% agreed. And 50% agreed with the statement that one could be a "good Catholic" and "never go to Mass"! Hence, using church attendance as the main indicator for religiosity raises two significant problems in Chile. Firstly, it runs the risk of greatly understating the number of significantly religious Catholics, which can affect analysis of the impact of individual religiosity-whatever form it takes-on political attitudes. As a result, it is better to define religiosity through an index based on a battery of questions, as we have done with our survey. Secondly, given the disparity between Catholics and Protestants in the gap between religiosity and practice, defining religiosity through church attendance in the Chilean context is bound to produce a considerable overrepresentation of Protestants among respondents who are judged to be highly religious.
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The 2002 census shows that Protestants constitute 17.2% of the total population, but
given their higher levels of weekly church attendance (in our survey 60% reported such a practice), they constitute a much higher percentage of all Chilean churchgoers. In urban popular sectors on any given Sunday there may be as many Protestants as Catholics in church services (Fontaine Talavera and Beyer 1991, 82-83) . Many survey analysts are hardly aware of this consequence of the indicator they use, given that they assume that the great majority of churchgoers are Catholic just because most respondents identify themselves as such.
In fact, the assumption that most survey respondents in Latin America are
Catholic is so widespread that questions are often lexically flawed by it. For instance, the question on church attendance is often phrased as "How often do you attend Mass?" This wording overlooks the fact non-Catholics may well answer "never" despite attending religious services several times a week. In the Chilean context this may lead to undercounting the numbers of highly religious persons. To capture respondents' religiosity in our survey we asked a number of common questions, but we followed them with others directed at Catholics or Protestants that reflect the specificities of their religious practices. Our index of religiosity takes these differences into account, although we reduce the items to a common scale. 14 It is a seeming paradox of Chilean history that the clerical/secular conflict meant
that the most secularizing forces ended up garnering the political support of some of the most highly religious segments of its society. Therefore, in studying the impact of religion in the country it is indispensable to keep the distinction between Catholics and Protestants in mind. The most religious voters in the country will tend to support different parties (and in part different coalitions) given their denominational identities.
Political Divisions among Catholics
Chilean Catholicism came to terms with Republican Democracy soon after independence from Spain, and in this sense it was closer politically to the progressive Catholicism of Belgium than to that of France, Italy, or Spain (J. S. Valenzuela and Maza Valenzuela 2000, 195-96) . Conference as the Vatican increasingly appointed bishops from conservative ranks (Mönckeberg 2003, 217-31) .
As a result, religious Catholics remain divided. Some tend to adopt progressive while others more conservative conceptions of the faith-the first with an emphasis on human rights and the social gospel, and the second on personal morality. These tendencies are generally reflected in different parishes, lay associations, and schools, assuming the characteristics of a social cleavage. Politically, progressives tend to identify with the Concertation, often because they support the Christian Democrats, while conservatives lean towards the Alliance, supporting most characteristically the UDI.
However, both are equally religious, and the public at large is well aware that the Christian Democrats and the two parties of the right are closer to the Church than other parties are. Thus, on a scale of 1 (proximate) to 5 (distant), our survey respondents ranked the parties of the right and the PDC as about equally proximate to the Church (59% assigned a 1 or a 2 to UDI, while 55% did so to RN and the PDC).
In sum, the Concertation does not only include a majority of Protestants among its religious supporters given their proclivity to side with the anticlerical forces. It also includes religious Catholics, drawn primarily from those who have a more progressive conception of their own religiosity. Hence, simply measuring "religiosity," even with an index drawn from a battery of questions aimed at capturing the numbers of religious Catholics, cannot be expected-anymore than measuring religiosity through church attendance-to detect the influence of religiosity on voter choices for either the Concertation or the Alliance. Indeed, our religiosity index does not reach statistical significance in a regression model in which the dependent variable is voting for the Concertation or the Alliance.
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Our interpretation of this result is different, however, from that given by Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) . It is precisely because of the interweaving of religiosity, both
Catholic and Protestant, with voter options for the nation's parties that this result occurs.
These historical legacies effectively cancel out the effects of religiosity on voter preferences for either coalition, precisely because they are still salient. In other words, it is the impact of "religiosity" itself (Catholic and Protestant), and the greater propensity of Protestants to attend church services, that obscures finding a difference among supporters of either coalition based on the extent of their religiosity. Hence, as we show below, other measures must be used to determine whether and how religious cleavages still influence voter options.
The Impact of Religious Identities on Ideological Self Positioning
The parties of the center-left and left that emerged in the first decades of the twentieth century in Chile drew their inspiration from secular humanism, Marxism, and revolutionary syndicalism. Their social bases of support came from segments of society whose central characteristic, even beyond their class background, was the extent of their de-Christianization. The legacy of this aspect of the relationship between religion and politics in Chile is an enduring association between irreligiosity and leftism. Moreover, the longstanding link between Protestants and anti-clerical parties that positioned themselves as centrist to leftist forces on the ideological-programmatic spectrum led Protestants, on average, to place themselves to the left of Catholics.
Both of these observations are sustained by our survey. Figure 1 graphs the ideological self-placement (hereinafter ISP) of respondents according to their religious identity and levels of religiosity. 17 The sharpest ISP difference occurs between respondents who score zero on our religiosity index and those who have some degree of religiosity. The ISP of irreligious respondents is 3.65 on a 1 (left) to 10 (right) point scale, and is noted by the point in the bottom left quadrant. Protestants at all levels of religiosity also position themselves more to the left than Catholics, obtaining an average score of just over 5 while that for Catholics is just over 5.5. Moreover, the lines in the graph indicate-despite the minor exception created by mid-level religiosity among
Protestants-that increasing levels of religiosity create a rightward drift regardless of denomination. These patterns illustrate the continuing effects of religiosity and denominational identities in ways that are highly consistent with the political tendencies that emerged historically from the nation's party-generative cleavages, and they are reminiscent of those found in France (Converse and Pierce 1986, 161-69; Michelat and Simon 1977) . Since Protestants also tend to have lower socioeconomic status than Catholics, their self-placement more to the left on the ideological spectrum could be a consequence of their class position rather than their religious identity and its historic connection to the party system. To address this question we ran a regression model in which we coded "Catholic" and "Protestant" into a dummy variable (1 and 0 respectively), and added gender, age, education (the last level of formal schooling), and a measure for "class position." This variable derives from an assessment made by the interviewer based primarily on the value of the interviewee's home and its household goods and furnishings. It is designed to capture past income flows, wealth, or intergenerational income transfers. The results (not shown) indicate that the Catholic to Protestant difference does exert the strongest effect in the expected direction over ISP. Net of the other variables, Catholics place themselves on average nearly four tenths of a point more to the right than Protestants (B= .384, p. <.05). ISP is also affected by gender, with men self-placing three tenths of a point more to the left, and by age, with an additional year moving people a tenth of a point more to the right (both results significant at p <.05).
Education and "class position" have no impact.
Levels of Religiosity as Determinants of Ideological Self-Placement
Left-to-right ideological self-placement has the important advantage of offering a window to the political views of all respondents. The fact that Catholics and Protestants have different ISP at all levels of religiosity does not prevent us from adding them together to analyze the impact of such levels on ISP. An additional advantage of ISP is that close to 90% of our respondents placed themselves on the scale, while only 31% told us which party they preferred. Chileans are reluctant to reveal their party preference but ISP is a good proxy for it. Thus, when asked to place the nation's parties on the same tenpoint left-to-right scale on which they so readily place themselves, survey respondents in Chile have shown repeatedly that they do so accurately in the sense that their judgments coincide-on average and with very low standard deviations-with the assessments of trained observers. And survey respondents who reveal their party identification tend to assign to their preferred party a score that basically coincides with the one they give themselves.
18 These characteristics of Chilean voters help to explain the low levels of electoral volatility in the country. They also mean that when most subjects reveal their ISP they are essentially indicating where their party sympathies probably lie. There may be some ambiguity in interpreting an ISP score of 5 (does it hide non-answers?) or in using the score to identify exactly which party a respondent prefers among parties with proximate scores, such as the PRSD and the PDC. But if a respondent reveals, say, an ISP of 7, there is very little probability that such a person sympathizes with any of the parties in the Concertation. Moreover, such a score would most probably identify the respondent with RN rather that UDI. This latter party's score and the ISP of its supporters average over 8 (Huneeus 2005, 74 and 80) . "middling," and "high," with "unimportant" as the reference category.
The robustness of religiosity as a central determinant of ISP shows through clearly in Table 1 . In Model 1 the religiosity index pushes ISP to the right at all levels of religiosity, starting with a minimum of 1.32 points and ending, as religiosity increases, with a maximum of 1.77 points on the scale. This virtually replicates the bivariate relationship depicted in Figure 1 , as none of the other variables are significant except for a trace effect in the expected direction of the household adult per capita income measure, best appreciated in the standardized beta column.
Substituting the individual religiosity index with the importance of religion in the family of origin, as in Model 2, retains a somewhat weaker but still robust effect of religion on ISP. Like the religiosity index, it also has a linear quality, increasing a rightward drift from .87 to 1.27 points as respondents report having grown up in families of low to high religiosity. The statistical significance levels of these results also increase step by step as the error terms remain basically constant. In Model 1 gender almost reaches statistical significance at the <.05 level, but in Model 2 this variable has a relatively important effect at a <.01 level. The weaker measure for religiosity in this model reveals an association between being male and a leftward ISP drift of a little less than half a point.
However, with Model 3, it becomes clear that the leftward drift of being male is most probably a consequence of the lower levels of religiosity among men, because reintroducing the religiosity index once again reduces gender to a level just below statistical significance. Model 3 also shows that our individual religiosity index is a much stronger predictor of ISP than the level of religiosity in the family of origin. The robustness of the latter's effects on ISP decline considerably as they are trumped partially by the religiosity index, and yet such effects do not disappear entirely. Model 4 is not quite comparable to the previous ones given that the lower numbers of respondents to the question regarding father's ideology reduces the number of cases from around 950 to 474. However, adding this variable not only reveals it to be highly significant in producing a moderate rightward effect on ISP. It also alters the effects of the religiosity index, sharpening the impact of the highest level of religiosity on ISP to 2.26 points on the left-to-right scale, but reducing the statistical significance levels of the mid to lower levels of religiosity. At the same time, the addition of father's ideology causes the effects of the importance of religion in the family of origin to disappear, generating even negative terms at its high ends. And yet when pairing father's ideology with the importance of religion in the family of origin without including the religiosity index (model not shown), it is fathers' ideology that becomes irrelevant.
Hence, in this case the levels of religiosity in the family of origin become a surrogate for the extent of individual religiosity captured by our index.
In sum, the most significant variable affecting ISP levels is indeed the religiosity index. Nonetheless, as shown in Model 4, father's ideology does seem to exert an additional independent effect to that of the religiosity index. It probably results from the fact that respondents with weak to mid-level scores on the religiosity index tend to have more rightward ISP's when they report having fathers who were more on the right. It is also likely that such more rightist fathers formed part of families where religion tended to be more important. As a result, including all three of these variables as in Model 4 eliminates the impact on ISP of the higher levels of family religiosity that can be seen in Model 3, trumped as they are by father's ideology. Educational attainment also has a very slight leftward effect on ISP in Model 4, which barely surpasses the lowest level of significance.
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Running Model 4 with the religiosity index as a continuous stream rather than with categorical breaks (not shown here) produces similar results with a beta of .72 (significant at p<.01).
Effects of Religiosity among Concertation and Alliance Coalition Supporters
If religiosity is the clearest determinant of variations in ISP but its effects are not To test these hypotheses we ran regression models (not shown) only with
Concertation supporters who scored between 1 and 6 on the ideological scale. We eliminated the rightwing outliers because we did not want our results to be influenced by their characteristics (among which are high religiosity scores). We did the same thing with Alliance supporters, both "regular" and "occasional" (see footnote 16): we dropped those who self-placed between 1 and 4, or 8% of the total.
The results turned out as we expected. There is no effect of religiosity on the ISP of Alliance supporters (n=264) whether the religiosity index is broken into categories or run as a continuous variable. We ran these models with gender, age, household class position, and education, and only age has a trace effect producing a rightward drift.
Among Concertation supporters (n=361) the only variable producing any effect on ISP was religiosity; all control variables showed no significant influence. With zero to minimal religiosity as the reference category, all the other religiosity levels had statistically significant effects producing a rightward drift ("some" b= .855, significant at p<.01; "medium" b=.865, significant at p<.01; and "high" b=1. and .216 respectively, significant at p<.05). Hence, the more religious Protestants can also be expected to prefer the more centrist parties over the PS. Religiosity, or its absence, remains a key element in differentiating the political views, and presumably the party choices, of Concertation supporters.
Progressive and Conservative Religious Conceptions as a Factor in the Choice Between Party Coalitions
As noted earlier, Catholics may opt for different political coalitions given a progressive versus conservative split in their religiosity, and not simply as a legacy of their support or rejection of the military dictatorship.
To tap into this cleavage we asked respondents whether they approved, were indifferent to, or rejected the recent change to the civil marriage law, sponsored by Christian Democratic legislators, that legalized divorce. Attitudes toward this measure, which was opposed by the Catholic hierarchy, are a useful indicator of "progressive"
versus "conservative" forms of religiosity among Chilean Catholics. Hence, a regression model seeking to explain voting for the Alliance, the Concertation, or "one or the other" coalition, with our religiosity index as well as respondents' attitudes towards divorce among the independent variables, should show the impact of these attitudes on their preferences for either coalition while controlling for their overall religiosity. In other words, if a progressive/conservative split in the religiosity of the more religious respondents is associated with opting for different political coalitions, then our regression model should show that respondents' attitudes towards legalizing divorce have a significant effect on those options, while the index of religiosity should show no effects as both types of religiously inclined respondents share similar overall levels of religiosity.
To better assess the importance of this religious difference in dividing
Concertation from Alliance supporters, it is useful to add among the independent variables one that captures in a nutshell the "yes/no" division. A question regarding the degree of trust respondents have in the Armed Forces does just that, in so far as those who express such trust are mostly people who supported the "yes" and vice versa. (We have dichotomized this variable to make it easily comparable with the one that captures attitudes in favor or against divorce, such that 1 equals "very much," "much," or "considerable" confidence in the Armed Forces, while 0 captures "little" or "no" confidence in them.) Among the independent variables we added as well gender, age, household per capita income (divided into sextiles), and education-all as defined above.
The results, using multinomial regressions and run only among respondents who identify as Catholics, appear in Table 2 .
The first set of figures in Table 2 pair support for the Alliance with support for the Concertation. They reveal that having "confidence in the Armed Forces" is, as expected given the recent history of Chile's political coalitions, a variable that is strongly associated with supporting the Alliance. Catholics who trust the military are 3.21 times more likely to be Alliance supporters than those who do not have such trust. However, opposing legal divorce has an even greater impact on determining a vote for the Alliance.
The reference category here is support for legal divorce, and Catholics who are against legalizing divorce are 3.62 times more likely to prefer the Alliance than their sisters and brethren who support such a measure. These are solid results: the logits in both cases are more than four times the error terms, with p-values of less than .001. And, as expected, the religiosity index has no significant effect. Hence, Catholics supporting either coalition have similar degrees of overall religiosity, although those who support the Concertation have a less orthodox conception of their faith, at least as seen from their reaction to the divorce issue.
The income per capita variable produces even stronger effects than divorce at the fifth and sixth sextiles, although at lower levels of significance. The reference category is households with the lowest income. Respondents from such households prefer the Concertation, and hence the propensity to vote for the Alliance increases, in general, as household incomes increase as well. This shows that there is a social class difference among Concertation and regular Alliance supporters in the expected direction, a result that holds even when running this model with the whole sample (not shown here), and not only with Catholics. Other variables have no influence. *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001 Note: The table excludes Protestants, irreligious respondents, and 58 respondents who had more than trivial religiosity but who stated that they had no specific religious identity. Irreligious and Protestant supporters tended to favor the legalization of divorce.
The second set of figures in Table 2 here. It is only with this complexity in mind that the full extent of the effect of religiously based differences on voter options can be appreciated. And while our focus here has been on religion, our survey does provide evidence for the continuing effects of class on political divisions as well. The Concertation is supported generally by the poor.
Did the current configuration of the party system really emerge only as a result of the "yes/no" to Pinochet? This may have been the trigger for it, but in the last analysis the answer is "no, not really." If, as we argue, the division between the Concertation and the Alliance is rooted in the historic political effects of religious and class differences in Chilean society, this also helps explain why this configuration of the Chilean party system emerged in the first place, and why it has proved to be enduring. In other words, its endurance is more than just a figment of the peculiar binomial electoral system imposed by the dictatorship's electoral law. The formation of a coalition such as the Concertation was within the realm of possibilities for the nation's multiparty system for a long time. It is a coalition that places all center to center-left forces, regardless of whether they are of social Christian or of social democratic orientation, in the same framework.
And yet this kind of coalition was difficult to achieve in the past. There was strong resistance to overcoming the barriers between religious and irreligious political cultures, and there were key institutional issues pertaining to the place of the Church in national life that created differences and resentments. Moreover, the secular social democratic pole in Chile was weak. The Radical Party was more committed to anticlericalism than to an effective social reform program, and the Socialists were split into various factions, among which social democrats were a minority. It proved to be easier to form coalitions were invited to discuss their religious beliefs and their attitudes regarding contemporary moral, social, and political issues. The value to this research of these exercises cannot be overemphasized. They sensitized the senior researchers in this project to the way the two sets of women conceived and described their own religiosity-in particular to the relative importance they assigned to public and private expressions of it-and how it colored their views of issues such as friendship across religious denominations, sex before marriage, cohabitation, contraception, gender roles, and divorce. The women also reflected on morality in public affairs. They placed a high value on a male candidate's marital and family life as a test for the credibility of his claims and promises. While the women expressed a preference for political leaders who shared their religious beliefs, the quality of a politician's moral vibre took precedence over his or her apparent religiosity.
They also spoke approvingly of having a woman as candidate for the presidency of the republic, but only as long as she shared, by and large, their own political views.
In constructing the survey, Scully and Valenzuela also relied on their past experiences and observations (Scully as a priest in a popular Santiago neighborhood, and
Valenzuela as part of a Methodist family). They also examined other survey instruments focusing on religion, most of which were written to be applied in the US or Western The sample was drawn by first dividing each metropolitan area into neighborhoods with roughly equal numbers of inhabitants. Each interviewee was chosen by selecting at random, in successive order, a neighborhood, a street, and a house on that street. When at the house, the interviewer was asked to obtain the list of all adults over 18 that lived there, and-in case there was more than one adult-to select one of them for the interview at random. If after a third attempt the interviewer could not find anyone at home, he or she was instructed to select another house on the same block at random.
Interviewers were also instructed not to conduct the interview and to select a different house on the block if respondents turned out to be Jewish, Mormon, Muslim, or of any other non-Christian faith. Followers of such faiths constitute small minorities of the Chilean population. However, respondents were interviewed if they claimed to have no particular religious identity or religious belief.
The survey was applied to 1201 respondents. An additional 120 Protestant respondents were also interviewed. They were selected through a snowball method:
Protestant respondents who were part of the random sample were asked for names of their acquaintances-who were then randomly selected for inclusion. However, in examining the responses obtained through this method it became clear that these interviews were not reliable: there were significant differences between them and those furnished by the Protestants who showed up in the random sample. Hence, all these interviews were eventually discarded.
Appendix II The Index of Religiosity
The religiosity index was constructed from questions applied to the whole sample as well as from those that targeted only Catholics or Protestants. The following table contains the questions, the groups to which they were directed, and the values from 0 to 3 that were assigned to each answer. The religiosity index was developed in six steps:
1. Selection of questions. For each group (Catholics, Protestants, and nonreligious), we selected a set of questions that would be used for building the index. As shown in the table above, at least four questions were used for all respondents, but the indexes for Catholics and Protestants were complemented by sets of questions specifically designed for each of these two groups.
Definition of index values.
As shown in the table above, we gave a numeric value ('index value') to each answer category for every question used in the index of religiosity. Such numbers reflect the importance of the answer for an ideal typical construct of religiosity levels.
Creation of new variables with the index values.
We created a new set of variables that show the index values chosen for each of the selected questions. For instance, if in the original variable/question a respondent reports reading the Bible or Biblical passages 'Several times a week,' we assign him or her a value of '3' in a new variable. If the answer is 'Once a week,' in that new variable he or she gets a value of '2.' We did this for all the questions selected for each group (step 1) and their respective index values (step 2). We also looked at the bivariate correlations among these new variables. All the correlations are positive, and most of them are significant at the .001 level. However, only a few of them are above .5. These results reinforced our presumption that, although all of these variables are probably tapping the concept of 'religiosity,' they are measuring different aspects of religiosity, which justifies combining them into a single index. 19 We tested models with a reference category for the religiosity index that is twice the size of the one used in Table 1 . This requires adding cases that have low levels of religiosity to those that have zero. This obviously weakens the results obtained with the religiosity index, but they are still statistically significant and do not change the patterns in Table 1 . These results and the strength of the effects of religiosity buttress our confidence that collinearity is not a concern in Table 1 .
